DEEP: Extending the Digital Forensics Process Model for Criminal Investigations by Collie, Jan & Overill, Richard E.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
DEEP: Extending the Digital Forensics Process Model
for Criminal Investigations
Journal Item
How to cite:
Collie, Jan and Overill, Richard E. (2020). DEEP: Extending the Digital Forensics Process Model for Criminal
Investigations. Athens Journal of Sciences, 7(4) pp. 225–240.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© [not recorded]
Version: Version of Record
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.30958/ajs.7-4-3
https://www.athensjournals.gr/ajs/v7i4
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
Athens Journal of Sciences- Volume 7, Issue 4, December 2020 – Pages 225-240 
 
https://doi.org/10.30958/ajs.7-4-3                                         doi=10.30958/ajs.7-4-3 
DEEP: Extending the Digital Forensics Process Model 
for Criminal Investigations 
 
By Jan Collie

 & Richard E Overill
±
 
 
The importance of high quality, reliable forensic analysis –an issue that is 
central to the delivery of justice– has become a topic for marked debate with 
scientists, specialists and government bodies calling for improved standards 
and procedures. At the same time, Law Enforcement agencies are under 
pressure to cut the cost of criminal investigations. The detrimental impact that 
this has had on all forensic disciplines has been noted internationally, with the 
UK’s House of Lords warning that if the trend continues, crimes could go 
unsolved and miscarriages of justice may increase. The pivotal role that digital 
forensics plays in investigating and solving modern crimes is widely 
acknowledged: in Britain, the police estimate it features in 90% of cases. In fact, 
today’s law enforcement officers play a key part in the recovery, handling and 
automated processing of digital devices yet they are often poorly trained to do 
so. They are also left to interpret outputs, with the results being presented in 
court. This, it is argued, is a dangerous anomaly and points to a significant gap 
in the current, four-stage digital forensics process model (DFPM). This paper 
presents an extension to that model, the Digital Evidence Enhanced Process 
(DEEP), with the aim of fine-tuning the mechanism and ensuring that all digital 
evidence is scrutinised by a qualified digital forensics analyst. The consequence 
of adopting DEEP in actual criminal investigations will be to ensure that all 
digital evidence is analysed and evaluated to the highest professional and 
technical competency standards, resulting in the enhanced reliability of digital 
evidence presented in court which will serve the cause of justice in terms of 
reduced instances of associated unsafe convictions and/or unjustified 
exculpations. 
 
Keywords: Digital forensics, forensic science, evidence processing, knowledge 
management 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the last ten years, no fewer than eight reports assessing the state of forensic 
science in England and Wales and offering recommendations to address the 
challenges have appeared (Tully 2015, 2018, 2019, Government Office for 
Science 2015, Science and Technology Committee 2011, 2013, 2018a, The Law 
Commission 2011). Two influential reports addressing similar issues have also 
been published in the United States (Committee on Identifying the Needs of the 
Forensic Science Community 2016, Executive Office of the President 2016). In 
Britain, concerns over the handling and disclosure of digital evidence by police 
became public three years ago after a number of rape trials collapsed and other 
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sexual assault cases were dropped when it was discovered that vital information on 
mobile phones had either been missed or had not been entered in prosecution 
evidence (Guardian 2019). An enquiry into these and other failures was quickly 
organised by the House of Commons Justice Committee with a range of specialist 
witnesses being called to give evidence (Justice Committee 2018). Among these 
was the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR), Dr Gillian Tully, who is tasked with 
regulating forensic science activities within the UK legal system (Tully 2017). 
Following earlier testimony from a digital forensic practitioner pointing out that 
front-line police officers, with little or no training in digital forensics, were making 
interpretations of evidential outputs that then went before courts,  the FSR agreed: 
"One of the big issues that I see… is that the digital forensics units are quite good 
at keeping up to date with technology for extracting data and making copies, but 
they then pass the copies, largely uninterpreted, to police officers, who are not 
experts and who are not digital forensics people. General policing investigators do 
not necessarily have the tools to search that information effectively and understand 
it". She added that digital forensics now pervades almost every aspect of policing. 
"Frontline officers are doing all sorts of different types of what we would formerly 
have called digital forensics, so there is an issue with how you get any form of 
control over something that is so pervasive throughout all of policing".  
A later enquiry was held by the House of Lords’ Select Committee on 
Science and Technology, which also heard oral evidence (Science and Technology 
Committee 2018b). During one session, the Head of the Metropolitan Police’s 
Digital, Cyber and Communications Forensics Unit, Mark Stokes, estimated that, 
including cases involving CCTV, communications data, social media data and 
cyberattacks, around 90% of crime has a digital element. He made an equally high 
estimate for most fraud, murder and complex rape cases. Stokes described today’s 
police officers as "digital natives" who could use social media and current 
technology but they did not know the constraints and limitations of that 
technology. He acknowledged that: "Training on what should be seized and how it 
should be handled is absolutely critical and there is a lack of that". A core part of 
police training should be around the digital world, he added. 
Enquiries by both houses of Parliament concluded that urgent reforms were 
necessary. A report from the House of Commons Justice Committee stated: "It is 
clear, from the evidence that we have heard, that the growth in digital material 
presents a challenge to police and prosecutors. We believe that police forces are 
not always adequately equipped or properly trained to handle the type and volume 
of evidence that they now routinely collect and that this can lead to errors when 
reviewing and disclosing material and therefore has the potential to lead to 
miscarriages of justice" (Justice Committee 2018). 
A report from the House of Lords gave the forceful view that all forensic 
science in the UK "is in a state of crisis" due to an absence of high-level 
leadership, a lack of funding and an insufficient level of research and development. 
It warned: "The delivery of justice depends on the integrity and accuracy of 
forensic science evidence and the trust that society has in it" (Science and 
Technology Committee 2019). 
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Although the House of Lords has highlighted the danger posed to justice by 
inadequacies in forensic science in general and the House of Commons has done 
the same in respect of digital forensics in particular, no call has been made by 
these or other authorities to stop or alter the current practice of allowing regular 
police officers to either perform forensic procedures on digital devices or to 
attempt to interpret the outputs. Law enforcement agencies have been subject to 
severe budget cuts over a number of years, leading to a lack of resources and 
appropriately trained personnel. Extending the remit of front-line officers into the 
performance of specialist tasks can be seen as one of many cost-cutting exercises. 
The authors do not believe that this situation is acceptable, but it is nevertheless 
what currently exists and, given the current financial climate, what is likely to 
persist. A solution is clearly necessary if the cause of justice is to be better served. 
A step towards achieving that solution, we suggest, is to implement a more 
informed method of processing digital evidence.         
 
 
Literature Review 
 
Digital Evidence: The Need for Accurate Analysis 
 
The findings made by both the House of Commons and House of Lords 
confirm and validate the opinions expressed by practitioners and academics in the 
field of digital forensics. Stressing the potential impact on a person’s livelihood or 
liberty, Casey et al. (2018) asserted that the ability to interpret digital evidence 
accurately is crucial in order to "avoid mistakes, missed opportunities, 
misinterpretations and miscarriages of justice". Similar points have been made by 
Collie (2018), who commented, "Digital forensics is meant to be based on science, 
not supposition… And in every case, somebody’s freedom is at stake". Both 
Casey and Collie have raised concerns over the handling of digital devices by 
police with minimal training. 
"Typically, police with limited digital forensic expertise have the initial 
responsibility to recognize sources of digital traces and to apply basic preservation 
and processing methods. They are at high risk of not realizing limitations in the 
methods and tools that are available to them, leading to mistakes and missed 
opportunities" Casey (2019) says, adding that this is due to "gaps in knowledge". 
The risk continues to increase because of the "dynamic nature of cybercrime and 
technology". 
Collie (2018) has highlighted the every-day situation in the UK, where a 
suspect’s mobile phone is frequently given to a police officer with minimal 
training to perform a download.  The results from the forensic tool used for the 
extraction, "will be handed to someone with even less or, more likely, absolutely 
nil training in digital forensics: the Officer in Charge of the case (OIC). S/he will 
look at the outputs… whatever they make of it will go before the court". 
Shaw and Browne (2013) have also drawn attention to the risks involved 
when inadequately trained personnel perform a "technical" triage i.e., use a 
commercial forensic tool to target potential evidential data on some digital device. 
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One danger is that the resulting outputs may easily be misinterpreted.  Reviewing 
outputs from this type of automated process requires a "fairly high degree of 
knowledge and experience of digital forensics", the authors say.  However, the 
focus of their research is the development of an enhanced previewing system since 
they assert, given the vast amount of data that is now typically submitted for 
examination, that the primary concern of the digital forensics community is that 
evidential data may be overlooked if some exhibits are excluded.     
The use of enhanced previewing to assist decision making when assessing 
exhibits has been considered by James and Gladyshev (2013), too, and found 
effective. The authors examined the accuracy of forensic examiners’ personal 
choices when including or excluding exhibits, which were based on experience, as 
well as the accuracy of automated tools. Overill et al. (2013) have further proposed 
developing triage template pipelines as a way of narrowing down the volume of 
data needing full forensic examination. The approaches discussed above are based 
primarily on improving efficiency rather than quality. 
Screening seized devices for the existence of relevant evidence constitutes 
survey or triage for some authorities and preliminary forensic examination for 
others. Indeed, the very meaning of the word "triage" has been a matter for debate. 
In this paper, we follow Casey et al. (2013) in defining the triage process as the: 
"early extraction of information from digital evidence sources".   Casey et al. 
(2013) also stress the importance of promoting efficiency throughout a whole 
digital forensic investigation. This means making the most of limited resources, 
giving support for key decisions at key points and increasing the quality of 
findings – all aspirations that we aim towards with our proposed model. 
 
Confirmation Bias 
 
As Shaw and Browne (2013) observed, there is a propensity to misinterpret 
data when inadequately trained personnel try to interpret outputs from digital 
forensic downloads. Collie (2018), too, has pointed out that an OIC may choose to 
stress certain aspects of evidence above others if they appear to be useful to the 
case in hand. One example of an OIC "cherry picking" particular words from web 
browsing outputs from a mobile phone in support of a criminal charge and also 
confusing browsing results with user search results was related by Collie to the 
House of Commons’ Justice Committee. 
The risk of confirmation bias has also been raised by Casey (2018) who 
commented: "When forensic examiners concentrate on proving or disproving a 
specific claim, there can be a risk of confirmatory bias. To mitigate the risk, an 
increasing number of best practice guidelines are instructing forensic practitioners 
to evaluate the probability of evidence given on claim versus a given alternative 
claim". 
Casey (2019) again remarked that: "Roles, responsibilities, rewards, plus 
selection, training and culture all have a major influence on the objectivity of 
investigators and forensic specialists". Adding: "Without formalized independence 
of digital forensics in the investigative process, it is difficult to maintain scientific 
objectivity of the results". 
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Sunde and Dror (2019) have further emphasised the issue of cognitive bias as 
a source of error in digital forensics. Extensive research has shown that forensics 
experts are susceptible to bias when making decisions, they report, advocating that 
practitioners should test and eliminate multiple and preferably competing 
hypotheses when conducting examinations. This injunction echoes the 
recommendation made in the FSR’s codes of practice and conduct (2016), that 
alternative hypotheses should be considered when analyzing cell site evidence. 
Sunde and Dror (2019) conclude that bias cannot be totally eliminated but 
procedures to uncover cognitive or human errors are necessary. One means of 
achieving this would be to have forensic advisors involved throughout the 
investigative process, as Casey (2019) suggests. This is an issue which we also 
seek to address since the model we propose aims to maximise input from qualified 
examiners during the existing triage process. 
Citing the problems identified by these and other authors, Horsman (2019) 
has noted that there is a lack of dedicated research and formalisation of 
investigative decision-making models to support digital forensic practitioners. He 
has proposed a framework designed to help practitioners at all levels to assess the 
reliability of their "inferences, assumptions and conclusions". Whilst taking 
numerous aspects of the decision-making process and quality management into 
account, the model is very complex. It also does not address the immediate 
problems faced by front-line law enforcement officers in handling and assessing 
digital evidence. The present paper suggests that the existing four-stage DFPM 
should be extended to include a routine that improves the model currently 
employed by law enforcement (LE) when processing digital evidence and helps 
ensure that data outputs and any deductions drawn from them are checked by a 
qualified analyst before being presented in a statement or report for court. In the 
proposed model, both the interpretation of data, i.e., understanding what events 
occurred and the evaluation of data, whether qualitative or quantitative, is taken to 
be carried out by a digital forensic examiner. The choice of evaluation 
methodology is a point for further research and debate and falls outside the remit 
of this paper.   
  
Digital Forensic Processing - Best Practice, Triage and Current Model 
 
Best-practice methods for collecting and securing digital devices have been 
laid out in numerous guides, the majority produced by LE and government 
agencies. These include the well-known Association of Chief Police Officers 
(ACPO) guidelines, first published in 1999 and last updated in 2012. In common 
with other published guides in this subject area, for example, First Responder 
reference works published by the U.S. Department of Justice (2008) and the U.S. 
Secret Service (2009), the ACPO guidelines are primarily aimed at serving 
officers but are also taken to apply to investigators and practitioners of digital 
forensics in the private sector. Most of the guides written for LE agencies do not 
cover the subsequent analysis of data, although the 2012 version of the ACPO 
guide does contain a brief section, giving views on who should carry out digital 
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forensic analysis and the need for that analysis to be properly targeted towards 
gathering evidence relevant to the case in hand. 
 The four aims of the digital forensic process, as identified from these 
guidelines and in order of importance are to: 
 
1. Identify the evidence. 
2. Preserve the evidence. 
3. Recover the evidence. 
4. Present the evidence.  
  
In the above context, "Identify" is taken to mean "know where digital 
evidence is likely to reside", i.e., on a computer, mobile phone, tablet, etc. 
In a business-oriented rendering, von Solms et al. (2006) have listed the four 
key activities of the digital forensic process as: 
  
1. Securing the evidence without contaminating it. 
2. Acquiring the evidence without altering or damaging the original. 
3. Authenticating that the recovered evidence is the same as the original 
seized data. 
4. Analysing the data without modifying it.   
  
A visual encapsulation of the process commonly employed LE is given in 
Figure 1. This is the model which we suggest should be modified and enhanced. 
  
Figure 1. The DFPM (the Current LE Model) 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
In this section we demonstrate the methodological development of the DFPM 
into DEEP in a series of evolutionary steps. 
 
Embellished DFPM 
 
In some crime-related investigations, police officers are tasked with carrying 
out the first two parts of this process, namely:  identifying devices of potential 
evidential interest and preserving them. In others, particularly those involving 
mobile phones, they can be tasked with the first three parts of the process, the 
PresentRecoverPreserveIdentify
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additional task being to recover data from a digital device. The DFPM can be 
developed to include this feature, as shown in Figure 2.   
  
Figure 2. The DFPM (Embellished) 
 
  
It should be noted here that an investigating officer may either hand on a 
device (such as a mobile phone) to another officer who has received some training 
in recovering data using a "kiosk" forensic solution, or they may have been trained 
to do this themselves. In an alternative scenario, usually one where computer 
equipment is seized, the device will be passed to a person who is properly trained 
to digitally image the equipment. A digital forensic analyst will then examine the 
image and produce a brief report of findings known as a Streamlined Forensic 
Report (SFR). The investigating officer may then use an automated, proprietary 
forensic tool on the image to look for specific activity, e.g., web-browsing.  
Whichever is the case, as has been discussed in the proceeding sections, we 
suggest that a logical knowledge gap occurs at this point in the DFPM, between 
the final two stages. We label that gap "Process" and generate an enhanced model 
(EDPM), illustrating this in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. A Five-Stage, Enhanced DFPM (EDFPM) 
 
 
  
Identify Preserve Recover Present
Investigating LE Officers
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Enhanced DFPM 
 
Using this new five-stage model, the current method of working used by LE 
and discussed above, can be rendered as in Figure 4. In this illustration, "Officer 1" 
may be the investigating officer or an officer trained to recover data using a kiosk 
solution. Once a data download from a mobile phone is obtained, any results 
gained are passed to the Officer in Charge of the case (OIC). Thus, a knowledge 
gap occurs because, in the case of mobile phones, a qualified analyst may never 
see any outputs from the device before an attempt at interpretation is made. With 
computers, a knowledge gap occurs because a qualified analyst carries out only a 
brief examination of the data and produces an SFR. This short, undetailed report of 
findings, goes to the OIC who tries to draw inferences from it. An SFR is intended 
to be for the information of both the OIC, to decide if there is enough evidence to 
support the charge made, and the solicitor for the defence, to decide whether the 
evidence should be challenged or whether the defendant should be advised to enter 
a guilty plea. An SFR is not intended to go before a court unless the findings are 
agreed between the prosecution and the defence sides. 
  
Figure 4. Current LE Processing Method: The Knowledge Gap 
  
 
Figure 5. DEEP – Its Location in the EDFPM 
 
 
 
  
DEEP
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Figure 6. DEEP – The Digital Evidence Enhanced Model 
 
 
Digital Evidence Enhanced Process (DEEP) 
 
We now introduce a model for DF processing which has been derived from 
assimilating and analysing the research literature discussed earlier in this paper and 
by considering the system that is currently in used by LE in the UK.  The model is 
termed Digital Evidence Enhanced Process (DEEP), and fits into the enhanced 
five-stage EDFPM, illustrated in Figure 3, at our proposed new fourth (Process) 
stage (see Figure 5). It replaces the method illustrated in Figure 4 with that shown 
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in Figure 6, and aims to fill the knowledge gap that occurs when an OIC untrained 
in digital forensics is passed (a) outputs from an automated download or (b) an 
SFR, by ensuring that data of potential evidential interest is scrutinised and 
interpreted by a trained DF analyst before being passed to an OIC.  When a trained 
DF analyst decides that the outputs acquired so far are sufficiently convincing to 
make an informed report in the light of the current enquiry, a straightforward path 
is followed.  However, if the trained DF analyst decides that the currently available 
outputs are insufficient to support an informed report, a loop is entered in which 
the analyst goes back to the original data. At this point, it may be the case that 
further analysis of the original data allows an enhanced interpretation of the 
original findings to be made. Alternatively, new findings that require further in-
depth analysis may be made. A report is produced once all the outputs relevant to 
the enquiry are sufficiently well explained. Note that, although the title "DF 
Analyst" appears explicitly only once in Figure 6, it is in fact implicit in the DEEP 
model that the DF analyst is also involved in the whole of the cycle that is 
concerned with returning to the original data for further analysis. 
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
In this section we demonstrate how our proposed DEEP model operates in a 
typical scenario based on an actual criminal case with which one of the authors 
was professionally involved as a digital forensic investigator, in order to display its 
advantages over the DFPM. This case study provides an illustrative validation of 
the merits of DEEP over the DFPM. 
Typical crime scene scenario: a police officer arrests a suspect at the scene of 
a crime. The suspect is carrying one phone which the officer takes into custody.  
Later, at the police station, the officer connects the phone to a "kiosk" facility, 
which contains the necessary hardware and software to: 
 
a) Obtain a data dump from the phone. 
b) Interrogate the data and filter it into categories e.g., messages, web 
browsing history. 
c) Run a keyword search across the data.  
 
The first officer completes steps a) and b) and then gives the outputs from the 
initial interrogation to the OIC. Using the same software tool as the first officer, 
the OIC runs a keyword search across the data set. Evidence of potential interest to 
the enquiry is found in web browsing outputs. This consists of pornographic words 
and phrases. 
The offence that the suspect has been arrested in connection with relates to a 
claim of child abuse, brought to police attention by the mother and involving a 
child of the suspect’s family. The OIC has seen words and phrases that suggest 
both an interest in indecent images of children and an interest in incestuous 
relationships. The OIC has seen words and phrases that suggest both an interest in 
indecent images of children and an interest in incestuous relationships. Between 10 
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to 12 words suggestive of the suspected offence have been found in the majority of 
rows of a table of outputs produced by the forensic software tool used. The OIC 
concludes that these are search terms that have been entered into the web browser 
by the suspect and writes a report for court to that effect. 
If the loop stops here, as happens in the existing processing model, the OIC’s 
report goes before the court without further question with the high likelihood of a 
conviction being handed down by the judge and jury. 
If, as in the DEEP model, the phone data dump is passed to a digital forensic 
analyst to assess and a proper interpretation of the outputs is made at this stage, it 
will be discovered that the web browser artefacts are not actually search terms but 
keywords picked up by the browser from the descriptions of content that is hidden 
in the webpage’s HTML code. The keywords are associated with video loop click-
throughs that are sited on the pornography web site’s main page. These would lead 
to full-length video content if a user clicked on the links. However, the video loop 
shorts are content that runs automatically when a user lands on the web site, the 
user does not actively choose to view the content unless they click the associated 
link. Furthermore, the keywords associated with the content do not reflect the 
particular search terms entered by the user into the browser before landing on the 
pornography website’s main page. These findings have important legal implications. 
The value of DEEP is further demonstrated when other outputs from the 
illustrative case used in the above case study are considered.    
Figure 7 below is a sample of data which consists of outputs from web 
browsing activity which has taken place on a mobile phone. It will be seen that the 
final column contains the source of the data and the third column to the left 
contains dates and times.  Both are revealing to the digital forensic analyst.  In this 
instance, the source is the Chrome browser installed on the mobile phone.  
Reading from the top down, the dates for the top four outputs (numbered 52–56 in 
the far left hand column) are all the same, the next recorded time is 1 second 
earlier, the next recorded time one second before that and the final three times, two 
seconds before that. What this tells a trained analyst is that this is not browsing 
activity carried out by the user of the mobile phone –clearly, no one can type an 
entire phrase in one to two seconds– but system activity which occurs automatically 
in the background. 
Compare the foregoing with Figure 8 below, where the source (final column) 
is again the Chrome browser. However, the marking ‘synced data’ will be seen. 
This means that the activity concerned did not occur on the mobile phone in 
question but on some other device which synchronises with a shared cloud-based 
service. Thus, it cannot be said that the device user carried out this activity. It can 
also be seen that the dates and times, in the third column to the left, vary, in a 
pattern which is indicative of normal user activity.    
(Note that Figures 7 and 8 contain words and phrases of a sexual nature which 
some readers may find offensive). 
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Figure 7. Initial Analysis 
 
 
Figure 8. In-Depth Analysis 
 
 
 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The application of forensic science in the criminal justice system has reached 
a crisis point. This applies to all forensic disciplines, but the spotlight has fallen on 
digital forensics in particular during the past two years. In the UK, concerns have 
been raised over the handling and disclosure of digital evidence by LE and, in 
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several well-publicised instances, court cases have been stopped or dropped as a 
result of failures in the system. Enquiries have been conducted by both the House 
of Commons and the House of Lords, both of which identified a lack of high 
quality and robust analysis, with a consequent detrimental impact on justice, and 
called for urgent improvements.       
Digital forensics plays a central role in the detection, investigation and solving 
of crimes. At the fore-front of the detection process, tasked with the recovery of 
devices that may contain data of evidential interest, are today’s law enforcement 
officers. Increasingly, where mobile phones are concerned, these devices are 
passed to officers with little or no training in digital forensics for download. The 
resulting output reports are passed on to other untrained officers. While computers 
are normally imaged and analysed by specialists, only brief findings are passed on 
to investigators. As a result of this anomaly, authorities in digital forensics have 
highlighted that mistakes and misinterpretations are made, potentially leading to 
miscarriages of justice. At the heart of this anomaly is a knowledge gap that needs 
to be filled.          
A four-stage DFPM model has previously been used to encapsulate the aims 
of the digital forensic process. This paper proposes that a fifth stage is necessary. 
This stage slots into the existing DFPM model at the point where investigating 
officers put digital devices into forensic processing. The current LE modus 
operandi is modelled in order to identify where knowledge gaps occur. A new 
model, DEEP, is proposed with the aim of improving and enhancing the LE 
process by ensuring that data of potential evidential interest is both seen and 
interpreted by a trained DF analyst before being passed to an OIC. 
The DEEP model has been carefully validated using a typical real-world 
crime scenario drawn from an actual digital forensic investigation conducted by 
one of the authors, and has been demonstrated to enable additional digital evidence 
to be uncovered whose evaluation and interpretation significantly changes the 
view of the case. Our contention is therefore that if DEEP were to be routinely in 
operation during criminal investigations, the risk of miscarriages of justice (both 
unsafe convictions and unjustified exculpations) would be reduced and the cause 
of justice served. 
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